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The Future of Psychoanalytic Institutes

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Both conceptual and institutional problems permeate psychoanalytic institutes. Although institutional problems are historically based, they also derive from confusions around ill-defined concepts that lead to arbitrariness, authoritarianism, and the stifling of creativity. Psychoanalysis is a humanistic discipline that is touted as a science but is organized as a religion. Problems surrounding the right to train pervade psychoanalytic schisms, and transmission comes through processes of anointment. Institutional "false expertise" invokes the aura of anointment where training analysts pass down received truth through an esoteric pipeline depending on genealogy instead of function. Quasireligious thinking and politics rush in to fill the gap between the level of claimed knowledge that affords qualification and the far lower level of real knowledge. Institutes should rely on evidence of candidates' performance and engage in open-ended inquiry.

Psychoanalysis has fallen on hard times. Analytic practice has declined worldwide with the advances in other psychodynamic psychotherapies, behavioral, cognitive, and biological treatments together with the inroads of managed care and other health insurers. As an intellectual discipline, there is relatively little productivity in psychoanalysis, especially as com-

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pared with the early days. As a movement, it has generally lost its éclat. Freud's reputation has been increasingly battered by apparently omnipresent "Freud-bashers."

Has this somewhat parlous state come to pass mainly because of external factors? Or have factors within the psychoanalytic movement played crucial roles? How important will psychoanalysis be for this century? How far has psychoanalysis accommodated to the major changes of the past century? Such questions go to the heart of the current problems of psychoanalysis and its institutions.

Rites and rituals prompt us to punctuate time and make it clear that things change. The millennium has made it clear that we are playing in a new ballpark in every sphere. But how far have psychoanalysts accommodated to and used the massive sociotechnological changes that have taken place since Freud's death? The extent of such changes has had dramatic effects on the context of psychoanalysis as method, treatment, body of knowledge, and institution. Important areas of change include globalization, changing occupational structures and family structures, longevity, changes in health insurance, the ascendancy of environmental issues, the rise of information technology, mass education, and endemic drug problems.

Moreover, things have changed and continue to change extremely rapidly. Countless scientific discoveries together with technological and medical advances are made every year. Such immense and rapid social transformations have huge social and individual consequences, mostly unknown and uninvestigated. The immense ramifications on our inner and interpersonal worlds and experience of exponential social change should be urgent, appropriate, and ideal objects of psychoanalytic inquiry.

Yet, in the main, psychoanalytic institutes have taken far too little account of these changes and have not engaged with them. They have often retreated and withdrawn into a perpetuation of closed-system thinking and inaction. They have blamed the outside world for their misfortunes and resisted internal change in the name of mythological gold standards of analytic purity. They have often clung to past ways of thinking in which they are so often stuck and only grudgingly accept some contemporary realities. Many psychoanalytic organizations and institutions have circled the wagons to resist external enemies. However, the opposite approach is required: Analysts need to proactively embrace and engage with the contemporary world to make significant psychoanalytic contributions.

But psychoanalytic institutes are scarcely equipped for the task. Too often they foster stagnation and stymie the creativity that should be

devoted to advances in psychoanalytic ideas and practice and open interrelations with other disciplines. Psychoanalytic institutions continue to be designed according to organizational and educational protocols and arrangements developed during the 1920s. The trappings of analysis so often remain what is debated. The nature of the analytic enterprise is scarcely clearer to analysts and the public than it was almost a century ago. Resistance is enshrined on the level of the American Psychoanalytic Association's Board on Professional Standards and its subcommittees. The Board consists of representatives of the affiliated institutes, the local educational bodies—as opposed to the Executive Council, which directly represents the membership. For example, the Committee on Certification to this day promotes conformity to a defense–resistance paradigm and discourages innovation among applicants. Institutes are often stymied in moving beyond tried and tired ways of teaching and received standards. This said, there are substantial moves towards liberalization, but the question is whether they are at the appropriate organizational level of the American Psychoanalytic Association where the education takes place or is accredited. Psychoanalytic Internet chat lines and bulletin boards have affected on the membership of the American Psychoanalytic Association in a liberal democratic direction. But are the reformist moves too little too late? Has the train left the station?

Current International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) president, Otto Kernberg, has recently offered what he termed "a concerned critique of psychoanalytic education" (Kernberg, 2000). In the article, he identified some common problems in institutes:

> a tendency to infantilise psychoanalytic candidates, a persisting trend towards isolation from the scientific community, a lack of consistent concern for the total educational experience of candidates, authoritarian management and a denial of the effects of external, social reality on psychoanalytic education. (Kernberg, 2000, p. 97)

Not content to lay the blame for the problems of psychoanalysis with the outside world, Kernberg sees "the lack of excitement conveyed by many psychoanalytic institutes regarding what they have to offer" (Kernberg, 2000, p. 112) as making psychoanalysis unattractive to other disciplines. Openness to relationships with other disciplines as they currently are rather than as stereotypes based on the quite different state of play decades ago is essential. Neuroscientific and psychological models have changed markedly over the past two or three decades, now allowing a place for psychoanalytic concepts within their theoretical approaches (see Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000). As Fonagy (1999) put it, "our progress

as a discipline crucially depends on breaking down the relative isolation of our discipline from the exciting scientific developments around." That isolation has bolstered the internal complacency and stagnation with correlative external negative impressions of the discipline.

Substantial issues needing to be addressed include the clarification and development of the nature and adequacy of psychoanalytic concepts, the history and sociology of their institutional implementation, and the creation of institutions that will bring about rather than discourage creativity. Although the hallmark of psychoanalytic technique is free association, psychoanalytic institutes seem to have been organized on the opposite principle, unfree association. Psychoanalytic institutions have been unfree associations of psychoanalysts which have promoted identification instead of questioning it, often stymied thought rather than fostering creativity, assumed the certainty of a dogmatic body of knowledge instead of viewing psychoanalysis as a method of inquiry. Instead of assuming a skeptical approach, psychoanalysts often relied on a closed, authoritarian approach depending more on revealed truth than on the examination of evidence. Too often, psychoanalytic institutes, central to the creation and transmission of psychoanalytic knowledge, have behaved like religious sects. Fratricidal squabbles are not aided by the fact that analysts in their professional lives look for the unconscious motives of their patients. In institutional disputes, they often default back to what they know—to their training and to their clinical practice. Rather than confront real issues, they often pathologize their opponents (see Leitner, 1999). They often adopt an idealized view of analysis and what it can do, and adopt a false analytic self to go along with this view institutionally, as Berman (2000) has recently argued. What happens to the concomitant denigration is moot, however. Kernberg asked what model psychoanalysis assumes and should assume in the education of analysts. Is it based on the model of a seminary, a trade school, an art academy, or a university? Kernberg (1986) asserted that present-day American psychoanalysis finds itself between a seminary and a trade school, whereas it should occupy the terrain somewhere between a university and an art academy. The problems of psychoanalysis are those of a humanistic discipline that has conceived and touted itself as a positivist science, especially in the United States, but has been organized as a religion.

So two quite interrelated issues emerge. The first is conceptual and the second institutional. It has often been observed that psychoanalytic concepts are ill-defined. Different analysts use the same word to mean different things. In 1958, Clara Thompson warned that the lack of con-

sensus about psychoanalytic concepts and technique among analytic leaders "leaves the field in a confused state and encourages untrained people to enter the field" (p. 46). Even members of the same schools are often deeply divided about their approaches. The authors of a 1997 study concluded that the analysts adopted quite different concepts of the connotation of the fundamental term "analytic process" (Vaughan, Spitzer, Davies, & Roose, 1997). Ken Eisold (1999) recently urged analysts to define the common ground in psychoanalysis:

> Currently we are unable to say what it is that defines us as psychoanalysts or psychoanalytically-oriented practitioners. There are consequences for that, internally and externally. Internally, without clarity about the nature of the work we engage in, we are hampered in thinking about training and continuing professional development. Externally, we cannot clearly differentiate ourselves from the competition. Unable to do that, we are not only hampered in defending ourselves against attack but also unable to state cogently what it is we have to offer that sets us apart. The public is understandably confused. (Eisold, 1999)

Robert Stoller (1983), a psychoanalyst and Professor at the Neuropsychiatric Institute of the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), undertook a study in which a filmed psychotherapeutic interview was shown to 27 professors of psychiatry at UCLA, all practitioners of psychotherapy. They were asked a series of questions ranging from concrete observations to therapeutic conjectures about the nature and treatment of the patient's problems. The only thing that the experts could agree on was that the patient was "not elated." This was a telling instance of how greatly experts disagree about the nature of the details of what occurs in psychotherapy including psychoanalysis. Stoller noted the following:

> Experts disagree on their interpretations of what is happening at the moment, what has been happening during the course of the therapy, what happened in the patient's life that contributed to the problems and what should be said and done from moment to moment in a psychotherapy in order for us to do our best work. They disagree on diagnosis, prognosis, etiology, psychodynamics, what the patient is feeling consciously at any moment and what can be inferred as to unconscious thoughts and affects. . . . I am not arguing that psychotherapy does not work but rather that we (in private or publicly) do not agree about what goes on (1983, pp. 3–4).

Stoller (1983) demonstrated how very difficult it is to get agreement about observation, process, and results in analysis and to achieve a competent research methodology that would not be too complex to use widely. He reminds us of the rhetorical tricks "so ubiquitous in the analytic literature that readers do not even notice what is being done to them and

what the readers do to their own capacity to think." Stoller quoted authors referring to psychoanalytic data where the accompanying text never gave the data:

> When these quotes appear in our literature, the reader is asked to believe that the data were there and that we readers would agree that they were observations true enough to support—confirm—the discovery announced in the rest of the sentence and the sentences of the paragraph, paper, or book that followed. (Stoller, 1983)

Stoller's (1983) examples included "Analysis revealed that . . ."; "Analysis unmistakably showed that . . ."; "I can only insist that psychoanalytic experience has put these matters in particular beyond the reach of doubt . . ."; "As a child, he must have fantasized that. . . . Therefore . . .", "Freud has repeatedly emphasized . . . which clearly indicates that . . ."; "The patient's associations proved that . . ."; "Analyses of the remote phallic period have taught me that in girls . . ." (pp. 7–8; See also Colby & Stoller, 1988; Peterfreund, 1983, 1985).

Under the veneer of orthodoxy and scientific or professional agreement, such statements provide a veil under which everybody could well mean something quite different from everybody else about any concept or observation whatever in the analytic field and not really understand each other! Stoller (1983) pointed out that those who do not openly face up to the weaknesses and incompleteness of their position may be trying to talk themselves out of the uncertainty they subliminally recognize by using locutions such as those in the previous paragraph.

One major consequence of the considerable conceptual issues and confusions is that a quasireligious attitude supervenes institutionally. As Clara Thompson noted in 1958, "the crusading character of psychoanalytic groups is well expressed by what they call themselves—that is, the psychoanalytic *movement.* Other specialties are not spoken of as 'movements'. The word has a religious aura" (p. 45).

Most psychoanalytic training disputes involve passed-down versions of the truth far more often than the examination of evidence. What is the nature of the body of knowledge to be transmitted in the training? Given that there are no agreed-upon definitions and approaches, no agreed-upon "unit of measurement" in psychoanalysis or agreed way of measuring it, its status as a developed science is questionable. As Bollas and Sundelson (1995) suggested, "It will take a long, long time indeed for psychoanalysis to come to anything like a convincing definition of itself." Yet at the same time, there is, as Bollas and Sundelson asserted, the creation of a "false expertise" among psychoanalysts:

> By assembling colleagues who agree with them and with whom perhaps, they can write books on a clinical topic, psychoanalysts can create the illusion that true science has taken place. But technical papers, conference appearances, and statistics about patients presumably suffering from a given syndrome are the trappings of expertise, not the substance (Bollas & Sundelson, 1995, pp. 136–37).

The problem of "false expertise" is the claim to be expert beyond the level that is warranted. If there is little agreement about basic terms and approaches, then the claim to expertise must therefore be correlatively flawed. Under a scientific description, psychoanalysis has become a confusion of the tongues of speakers of private languages. Naturally, this leaves open the question of whether psychoanalysis is the kind of field where expertise is possible. Every patient is different, and our human nature is not standard issue. Certainly, wisdom is needed in understanding human problems, but is that "expertise" based on the model of the medical or natural sciences?

Psychoanalysis can be viewed as a method, a therapeutic endeavor, a body of knowledge, and a theory of civilization. Focusing principally on the therapeutic application or on the body of knowledge as psychoanalytic institutes have done is a recipe for stagnation. Taken-for-granted "knowledge" can hamper progress. Focusing on the method provides a way continually to update and challenge assumptions, as psychoanalysis is fundamentally involved with uncertainty, confusion, subjectivity, experience and negative capability. It is an activity, a practice (whether the object is a person, a book, a group, or whatever). As Eisold (1995) suggested, it is a common mistake among analysts to think of psychoanalysis making discoveries about reality. This thereby lends authority to analysis on the model of Copernicus, Darwin, or natural science.

"Thus," Eisold observed, "psychoanalysis 'knows' about the deep and most fundamental reality of individual human experience: the extensive literature of psychoanalysis delineates and articulates the complex web of motivations and conflicts that always underlie human behavior." According to Eisold (1995), psychoanalysts are not so much experts on knowing what is in the primary process, the unconscious, and so forth, but in "not knowing and not understanding: being able to recognize the gaps in what we think we know and tolerating ignorance and uncertainty." Eisold (1999) wrote:

> The work of exploring the unknown aspects of human experience—what has been disavowed, obscured, repressed, forgotten, displaced, dissociated, avoided, reframed, etc. etc. etc.—the work of helping patients and clients to regain their

> capacity to think about the parts of their experience with which they are not in touch—cannot be embodied in any particular set of theories or techniques. It can only be embodied in the role of the analyst. (Eisold, 1999)

So there is not just one procedure, one technique, but a general approach based on skeptical questioning and unknowing, on gaps and spaces instead of positive knowledge or positivist science. Of course, analysts should not ignore outcomes or protocols—quite the contrary—but the nature of what it is to acquire knowledge in psychoanalysis needs to be recast. This implies that psychoanalytic education should not be the esoteric inculcation of established truths but the sharpening of the tools of skeptical inquiry to question everything, especially what is most taken for granted and holy. There is not one technique on the model of the latest and best surgical technique. Freud's recommendations should be seen instead as a stance, a general ethical approach or attitude to patients. This relates to why Bollas and Sundelson (1995) wrote about analysts assuming "false expertise," that there cannot be real expertise in analysis granted by the inculcation of a received body of knowledge. It is the position of the analyst that helps to bring about the transformation of unrecognized, disparate desires, feelings, and memories into language. The method is in essence an open rather than a closed system.

Eisold (1999) believes that the nature of psychoanalytic practice, whatever form it takes, is that it "sets out to restore the capacity to think about human experience, a capacity that has been disabled by anxiety and fear." I consider that a central aspect of psychoanalytic practice is to find "the words to say it," to put into words what has hitherto not been able to be said.

My book, *Unfree Associations: Inside Psychoanalytic Institutes* (Kirsner, 2000), deals with the nature of the psychoanalytic metaphor and quest, and particularly how psychoanalytic institutionalization has been out of kilter with the nature of psychoanalysis, on the basis of an inappropriate "false expertise." *Unfree Associations* sets out to explore some of these issues through detailing the sociopolitical histories of arguably the four most important institutes in the United States affiliated with the American Psychoanalytic Association: the New York, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Institutes.

While the cultures of these institutes are different, many problems are similar at base. A major aspect of the problems of institutes rested on the central importance of training and the status of training analysts. In his 1953 Presidential Address to the American Psychoanalytic Association, Robert Knight lamented the typical themes of difficulty in institutes:

> The spectacle of a national association of physicians and scientists feuding with each other over training standards and practices, and calling each other orthodox and conservative or deviant and dissident, is not an attractive one, to say the least. Such terms belong to religions, or to fanatical political movements and not to science and medicine. Psychoanalysis should be neither a "doctrine" nor a "party line." (Knight, 1953, p. 218)

In Knight's view, "the most pressing issue and the one charged with the greatest emotion has always been that of training" (Knight, 1953, p. 218). I was interested in investigating the training processes at institutes as the central sites for transmission of psychoanalytic knowledge and the qualification of analysts in the theory and practice of this knowledge. One conclusion from my studies on conflict and splits in psychoanalytic institutes is that ideological splits and conflicts often surround the issue of who appoints whom and who is a training analyst. My studies confirmed Arlow's (1972) observation:

> It is disturbing but true that most of the conflicts have originated over who shall have the right to train, that is, who shall be training analyst. . . . The training analyst is regarded as possessing the psychoanalytic equivalent of omniscience. It is from the training analyst that candidates claim their descent. In many places the professional career of an individual may be determined by who his training analyst was. (p. 559)

I found that an excellent heuristic device for understanding trouble in psychoanalytic institutes could be: "Find the training analyst problem!" The training analyst issue was paramount in all the institutes I studied. It is analogous with Charcot's discovery that marriage bed problems were so often behind neurosis, quoted by Freud: "C'est toujours la chose génitale. Toujours, toujours, toujours . . ." (Freud, 1914/1966, p. 14). It is always the issue of the right to train, always, always, always.

To be accredited for training, a candidate's analysis needs to be undertaken with a training analyst within the institute. A training analyst is an analyst who is qualified to carry on the personal analyses of candidates for training in analysis. This status, which privileges the therapy over the intellectual discipline, is the most prestigious one within analysis. It is the domain of people often fantasized to be "genuine" analysts, the real experts. It has brought with it the largest analytic practice. Moreover, the training analysis is where the real business of analysis is seen to be done and transmitted; as Kernberg (1986) observed, there is "the implicit assumption that the 'real' psychoanalytic education is the training analysis, that supervision is secondary, and courses only tertiary aspects of that training" (p. 802). Not only is the training analysis

what is seen to be unique to analysis, but it carries with it many "sacred," quasimystical meanings that are also related to its religious structure. The truth is seen as mainly already revealed, and analytic work is normally treated as a matter of applying tried and trusted techniques. This is achieved by transmission principally via the training analysis and is not regarded as publicly available. So influential is the training analysis in terms of the transmission of psychoanalytic ideology that analysands tend to follow their training analyst's theoretical orientation. In my view, the training analyst problem is an important part of the promotion of discipleship, submissiveness, conformity, and stagnation in psychoanalytic institutes, as the hierarchical issues seem more grounded in politics and mystery than on public protocols that demonstrate clearly higher talent among the training analyst caste.

The history of the psychoanalytic profession is rife with schisms, as Joyce McDougall (1995) aptly illustrated in "Beyond Psychoanalytic Sects," the concluding chapter of her book, *The Many Faces of Eros*. Moreover, in line with my contentions concerning the doctrinaire training practices of institutes, McDougall made the following statement:

> I think our greatest perversion is to believe we hold the key to the truth. . . . Any analytic school who thinks this way has turned its doctrine into a religion. . . . When we make our particular psychoanalytic theories into the tenets of a faith, then we're restricting our whole capacity for thinking and developing. . . . But what is our insecurity? Perhaps it's partly determined by the transmission of a psychoanalytic education which is largely based on transference: the attachment to one's analyst, as well as to supervisors and teachers, is permeated with strong transference affects. This may result in the idealization of thinkers and theories as well as leading to the opposite—the wish to denigrate them. (McDougall, 1997, p. 91)

The profession's penchant for idealization originates, unequivocally, with its very founding, as psychoanalysis has always been synonymous with the figure of Freud—who identified himself with psychoanalysis and psychoanalysis with him (Freud, 1914/1966, p. 7). Although the scope of Freud's explorations and insights have yielded some of the most far-reaching and systematic understandings of the human condition ever propounded, it is Freud's role as a codifier that has driven psychoanalytic training and psychoanalysis as a movement. His own patriarchal and charismatic example—in a field where no single paradigm of achieved knowledge has ever generated assent—has served as a model throughout much of the history of psychoanalytic training. Suffice it to think of the power and influence exerted by the figure of Jacques Lacan in recent

decades, or of the contentiousness that still animates, after more than half a century, relations between Kleinians and Freudians in Britain. As McDougall suggests, however, the model of idealization–denigration is a pervasive and, indeed, a structural one. It is by no means limited to the loftier and more influential stages of psychoanalytic politics worldwide, but finds a correlate in the day-to-day life and management of even the smallest and most inconspicuous of institutes or training centers. Training issues are everywhere and routinely resolved by fiat. Passionate power struggles, on the model of those between Freud and Jung, or between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, or between Lacan and the IPA, have always been ubiquitous, and can elicit a zeal that rivals forms of the most uncompromising fundamentalisms.

In the 1980s, I began to study American psychoanalytic institutions with the assumption that any closure was probably related with the medicalization of psychoanalysis with all the bureaucratic consequences involved. However, I soon found that the dynamics of institutional life in psychoanalytic institutions seemed to have nothing much to do with whether they were medical or nonmedical; whether they were eclectic, Freudian, Kleinian or Lacanian; whether they were in New York, London, Los Angeles, Sydney, or Paris. Although there were obvious and important differences, there were uncanny similarities.

Psychoanalytic institutions are normally organized as guilds that, in my view, are really internally focused cliques. They aim at the perpetuation of their ways of thinking (what they assume to be their body of knowledge that they pass on to their students) and tend to foreclose approaches that challenge their assumptions. They are not part of a wider university culture that, despite its many faults, at least rests on some wider protocols and accountability structures. Albert Einstein and Neils Bohr had fundamental disagreements about the nature of physics—general relativity versus quantum theory—as evidenced in the journals during the 1920s and 1930s (Whitaker, 1996). Yet their fulsome were different in kind from what was happening in the flourishing British Psychoanalytic Society over the same period of the 1920s. Ernest Jones insisted on continually testing loyalty and demanding "ultra" conformity within the Society and ensured that it kept far away from the eclectic school of psychotherapy, as exemplified by the Tavistock Clinic at the time (Hinshelwood, 1998, p. 99). The later "Controversial Discussions" between the Anna Freudians and the Kleinians exemplified these issues. Bohr and Einstein were physicists, not Bohrians or Einsteinians.

Psychoanalytic institutes are freestanding guilds that offer training,

intellectual and clinical seminars and forums, and referrals, providing a total professional environment without any checks and balances. Who analyzes who provides analytic pedigree. Critical questioning is subservient to issues of graduating, being promoted to training analyst, and getting referrals. Making oneself unpopular with the local analytic establishment is an unwise career move. With the field's focus on the subjective in a field with little or no external regulation or validation, psychoanalytic institutes are especially prone as institutions to cliques in fighting for power. Where members obtain their professional identities through their institutes and their professional livelihoods through referrals, conformity, discipleship, obedience, and not rocking the boat are almost mandatory. These internally focused institutions whose standards are set by those in charge make for an esoteric "pipeline" view of truth conveyed to candidates through the agency of the mandatory training analysis, which is generally regarded as far more important than the seminars and supervision in psychoanalytic training. A significant feature of the structure of psychoanalytic subcultures and institutions is that members' livelihoods are exquisitely dependent on referrals, normally from senior colleagues because they do not receive a salary but are generally in private practice. Power, patronage, referrals, and income are intertwined with the question of succession, of being anointed with legitimacy and money through referrals. Anointment to the status of training analyst provides candidates, which brings greater legitimacy and allows more practice with four- or five-times-per-week patients. It also brings supervisees, who are likely to become protégés and may join one's clinical seminar.

Psychoanalysis is far more than a field of academic exploration—it is a movement and therapeutic endeavor. These aspects feed back to the intellectual discipline. Psychoanalysts make claims to therapeutic knowledge and their institutions qualify practitioners. But what is the basis of these qualifications? Given the nature of the discipline and the level of knowledge within it, I would suggest that the claim to knowledge implied by qualification is far greater than the real level of knowledge. Instead of facing this central issue, analysts often substantiate the knowledge implied by qualification in terms of something akin to the biblical gesture of anointment. Writ large in the history of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, anointment is present in all other institutes as significant factors in their development. This particular form of quasireligious transmission is part of the "movement" aspect of psychoanalysis and resists any approach that relies on evidence.

Why do such training issues seem to lie at the heart of so many

analytic problems? In many other disciplines it is easier to find more public and objective data to settle issues. However, psychoanalysis is different, partly because of the kinds of deep philosophical and religious questions raised by the psychoanalytic search and metaphor, by the emphasis on subjectivity and experience. Answers to questions about the nature of the self, the mind, emotions, relationships, and human nature are not quantifiable, or easily classified and standardized. They are often experiential, subjective, uniquely individual, interpersonal, and philosophical. The nature of this complex field is suffused with uncertainty and ambiguity. I believe that the nub of the problem is reflected in the existence of presumed truth on a level that is unwarranted providing the stamp of qualification on graduates. The consequence of the institution of "false expertise" in psychoanalytic institutes is the aura of anointment where training analysts pass down the received truth through an esoteric analytic pipeline. As the level of real knowledge is far below the level of claimed knowledge, a vital and universal problem supervenes. In my view, the religious quality of anointment fills the gap between the level of claimed knowledge on which qualification rests and the far lower level of real knowledge.

Thus, when there is confusion in the field about most definitions and theories, transmission of received knowledge is esoteric rather than public. This has been seen as acceptable in psychoanalysis far more than in medical or scientific disciplines probably because the flaws in this thinking are masked by the special nature of psychoanalytic inquiry as subjective and experiential. Appeals to esoteric knowledge, to an unwarranted elitist "us-and-them" dichotomy of "real" analysts versus hoi polloi, are inevitable consequences of the creation of the vacuum that arises from a system where scientific status is based on private definitions. Quasireligious thinking and politics rush in to fill the void. When concepts, roles, and functions in psychoanalytic educational institutions are not clear and explicit, they inevitably become seminaries. Yet problems about the gap between "pretend" and real knowledge is not just the problem of institutes that claim to be founded on science. It also relates to problems in institutes that do not assert a scientific basis for psychoanalysis. These include the French institutes, parts of the British Institute, and the Jungians. In these instances, qualification rests on a different claim to a knowledge that is still based on certainties, claims to established bodies of knowledge, even dogmas. Often enough, they are institutionalized defenses against the skepticism and uncertainty that lie at the heart of the psychoanalytic method.

Psychoanalytic institutes are not merely charged with the task of transmitting achieved psychoanalytic knowledge but with the creation of new knowledge. However, the education system—still based on the tripartite Eitington model developed in Berlin in 1920 and adopted by the IPA in 1925, of training analysis, supervision, and seminars—fulfills only the transmission criteria, with the unfortunate consequence of stymieing rather than promoting creativity and new knowledge. Almost all institutes follow the Eitington model, which standardizes psychoanalytic education across the world. The IPA is the only international professional organization that is involved in specifying the practitioners' qualifications across national and international boundaries (Slavin, 1990, p. 6). The education system needs to be updated to take account of and use current systems and realities, new pathologies and discoveries in science, medicine, psychology, sociology, and many other fields. As Kernberg (2000) asserted, "While fundamental shifts in educational methodology have taken place in the academic world surrounding us, a cautious conservatism has dominated psychoanalytic education" (p. 98).

According to Kernberg (2000), progress in educational methodology, concern about outcomes, and a focus on generating new psychoanalytic knowledge may bring significant changes in infantalization of candidates. The new focus on function and effectiveness Kernberg (2000, pp. 112–114) contrasts with a paradigm that represents in effect two sides of the same coin, authoritarianism and defensive democratization and bureaucratization. I have seen this happen continually in institutes in the United States where decisions are put through endless bureaucratic processes to the point where anything creative is zapped by the lowest common denominator. I have witnessed reactions to real authoritarian, even corrupt, behavior as compensated by excessive democratization, which like bureaucracy can almost bring decision-making to a halt. Discussions of the trappings of psychoanalysis can divert attention from the real problems and the possibility of solutions through experimentation with different models, given that no ideal model exists.

Kernberg recommends major changes in training analyst status to transform it into at most a function in the education process. He advocates the elimination of the "military" ranking of members such as "associate members" and "full members":

> The presentation of a scientific paper should come after acceptance as a joyful welcome, and not one more initiation ritual. There should be an absolute separation of the personal analysis from the rest of the educational experience,

> so that the analysis has its own natural beginning and end. (Kernberg, 2000, p. 114)

Kernberg proposed some solutions to the problems of psychoanalytic education, including:

> a stress on 'step-by-step' evaluation of candidates' progression, a greater emphasis on the cognitive aspects of seminars and supervision, particularly, a systematic exploration of the psychoanalytic method and its applications, a re-examination of the usefulness of the function of the training analyst status, an integration of teaching and practical experience in systematic research, and the incorporation of contemporary educational methods as part of the strengthening of the academic ambiance of psychoanalytic institutes. (Kernberg, 2000, p. 97)

Many of Kernberg's suggestions are valuable, and the emphasis on open-ended research of a university culture within institutes is essential. I would add that an essential reason for the prevalence of unfree associations in analytic organizations has to do with the contradiction between the presumed and claimed level of knowledge enshrined in the qualification of the expert analyst and the real much lower level of knowledge in the field. I think that even were the organization founded on function rather than patronage politics and the pipeline, the deeper problem from which these arise would still ensue. Requisite organization for analytic institutions must rest on real knowledge and public protocols. Thus, the institution of training analyst must be based on evidence that those who hold the office have passed certain publicly assessable tests. Even if psychoanalysis is different from other disciplines because it is a process with open outcomes, training analyst status needs to be based on clear functional criteria and on demonstrable evidence of superior knowledge. That, of course, presumes that training analyst status should be maintained, a view that is fast coming more and more into question. Training analyst status as a signifier of higher caste status masks the problem by conveying the mistaken impression of real expertise.

In 1958, Clara Thompson called for openness in psychoanalytic education:

> So institutes do not have to be homes from which there is no escape. Their graduates should be encouraged to think and act for themselves. On the other hand, teachers from outside should be brought in, in order to stimulate constructive appraisal of the institute's theories. Psychoanalysts need to see themselves as part of a developing science to which they have a specific contribution to make, rather than as members of some isolated group, fantastically loyal. There are too many family groups in psychoanalysis, and if they continue, they may well make impossible its contribution to the science of human nature. (Thompson, 1958, p. 51)

She might have been writing about today.

What is to be done? It is important to understand the nature of psychoanalytic institutionalization and its regressive consequences, which I have explored in detail in *Unfree Associations.* The consequences of the institutionalization of psychoanalytic ideas through the psychoanalytic movement have been largely regressive. Rather than being resolved, many faults and problems in the psychoanalytic approaches have been perpetuated. It is probably too late for psychoanalytic institutions to become part of universities—that train has long left the station. But a university culture within institutes may be possible if such an approach can come to reflect the will of their members. In my view, the position of training analyst should be dropped, which would remove a structural flaw that maintains power based on hierarchical patronage and anointment. Candidates should be in analysis with an analyst of their choosing who has no part of the assessment process. Assessment at institutes should be carried out solely in terms of what the candidate produces in terms of seminar papers and presentations, and clinically through supervised cases. As "the proof of the pudding" would be in the eating, public protocols would prevail instead of anointment of certain people with avowedly esoteric gifts. I believe that a basic fault in psychoanalytic institutes is qualification on the basis of an unwarranted claim to knowledge. One way out is a radical opening up of analytic training more in line with the kind of philosophical Delphic exploration into human nature that constitutes psychoanalysis. Concomitantly, more open skepticism about psychoanalytic ideas needs to be accepted where the chips will fall where they may. Open-minded interdisciplinary research (philosophy, neuroscience, literature, sociology, genetics, biology, etc.) needs to be carried out, including much more definition of psychoanalysis so that analysts are using the same words to mean the same things. Even the concept of what is psychoanalytic needs to be broadened and at the same time more clearly specified. Psychoanalysis should not be seen as its trappings (number of times a week on the couch by an accredited member of the International Psychoanalytic Association). Psychoanalysis is a field of inquiry and is owned by no one any more than physics is. The truth is that spiraling costs and changes in insurance are pricing classical psychoanalysis out of the market, and the intellectual attraction of psychoanalysis is no longer pivotal in so many areas. Perhaps this condition where psychoanalytic approaches have once more achieved underdog status will allow the space for the imperialism that has so characterized the psychoanalytic movement to be replaced. The time may now be upon psychoanalysis to revive, instead, the once defining spirit of

open, skeptical questioning of all concepts and teachings, including those most dear to the profession. In this sense, it is time, perhaps, for psychoanalysis to be reminded of the wisdom of an Eastern maxim: "We seek not to imitate the masters, rather we seek what they sought."

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